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ABSTRACT
What is a visualization? There is limited utility in trifling with def-
initions, except insofar as one serves as a tool for communicating
and conceptualizing our subject matter; a statement of identity for
a community. To establish Visualization Psychology as a viable
interdisciplinary research programme, we must first define the ob-
ject(s) of our collective inquiry. I propose that while we might refer
to the study of “visualization” for the terms colloquial accessibility
and pragmatic alignment with other fields, we should consider for
exploration a class of artifacts and corresponding processes more ex-
pansive and profound: external representations. What follows is an
argument for the study of external representation as the foundation
for a new interdisciplinary endeavor, and approach to mapping the
corresponding problem space.
Index Terms: information visualization, external representation
1 INTRODUCTION
The language of representation is slippery and self-referencing. If
I show you a collection of artifacts containing marks on surfaces,
you might label some as pictures or art, others as diagrams, maps,
schematics, some graphs, charts or plots, and others also graphs
but you might use air quotes and call them “graph-theory graphs”.
Some you’ll identify as writing, and others, like writing but not
writing—some peculiar or particular systems of notation. The labels
you apply to each marking likely depend on your disciplinary back-
ground, and are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive. Which
of these, are visualizations?
2 ON VISUALIZATION
Let us start with definitions put forth in popular Visualization texts.
Stephen Few offers a functional definition, characterizing data visu-
alization as “an umbrella term to cover all types of visual representa-
tions that support the exploration, examination, and communication
of data. Whatever the representation, as long as its visual, and
whatever it represents, as long as its information, this constitutes
data visualization” [11, pg.12]. This is a delightfully inclusive
specification, according to which the words on this page would
constitute a visualization—but would scarcely be considered so by
most visualization practitioners. Why? Because visualizations are
somehow graphic in nature, more depictive than descriptive. From
Ware [32, pg.2],“a graphical representation of data or concepts.” In
fact, one might find it easier to depict the set of markings one consid-
ers visualizations than to describe them in words. Similarly, in their
timeless text, Card, Mackinlay and Shneiderman define information
visualization as, “The use of computer-supported, interactive, visual
representations of abstract data to amplify cognition” [6, pg.7]. In
both cases, we see the (appropriate) characterization of informa-
tion visualization as artifact and process. But we are left with an
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under-specification of what constitutes such an artifact. Need the rep-
resentations be interactive, computer-generated marks on surfaces?
Is the nature of the information constrained? What makes a marking
graphic? I draw on these examples not in critique of their notable
contributions, but rather to call attention to a gap in the foundation of
the field, and subsequent opportunity for psychologists (and perhaps
philosophers) of visualization to make an impactful contribution.
Definitions, as terminology, serve as tools for communicating and
conceptualizing one’s subject matter [5]. I argue that to establish
Visualization Psychology as a viable interdisciplinary research pro-
gramme, we must first define the object(s) of our collective inquiry.
To this I propose that while we might prefer the term visualization
for its colloquial accessibility and pragmatic alignment with the
SCI/VIS/VAST communities, there is an alternative characterization
of artifacts and processes more pertinent to the way “visualizations”
are encountered in everyday life: as external representations.
3 ON EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION
The term external representation stems from early cognitive science
and information-processing psychology; inquiries into the existence
and nature of mental representations (see [17, 20, 22]). Palmer ar-
gued that as cognitive representations are, “exceedingly complex and
difficult to study,” one might start with the examination of “noncog-
nitive” (ie. external) representations, as they are “simple, and easy
to study”1 [21, pg.262]. His subsequent elaboration of representa-
tional systems demonstrates there is much to explore with respect to
the nature and function of such “noncognitive” structures, without
reliance on the form of any internal counterparts. Zhang & Norman
described external representations as knowledge and structure, “in
the world, as physical symbols (e.g., written symbols, beads of aba-
cuses, etc.) or as external rules, constraints, or relations embedded
in physical configurations (e.g., spatial relations of written digits,
visual and spatial layouts of diagrams, physical constraints in aba-
cuses, etc.)” [34, pg.3]. Zhang later writes that the information in
external representations, “can be picked up, analyzed, and processed
by perceptual systems alone, although the top-down participation of
conceptual knowledge from internal representations can sometimes
facilitate or inhibit the perceptual processes.” [33, pg.180]. What is
wisely made explicit in these characterizations is the assertion that
external representations do not exist in isolation, rather, they work
in concert with internal representations, whatever their form.
In the proceeding decades, cognitive scientists took up the chal-
lenge of discovering how various forms of external representation
influence various forms of thinking; with particular attention to
the fashion in which representations support computation, such
as in problem solving [16], and scientific discovery [8]. Dis-
tinctions were drawn between the sentential/propositional, and
graphic/diagrammatic, where the latter class was taken up by its
own interdisciplinary community in the early 2000s. Educational
psychologists and learning scientists turned their attention to mul-
timodal representations (where modality refers both to the sensory
modality (eg. visual, auditory) as well as the encoding media [19,24].
By the late 2000s, sufficient interest across allied disciplines war-
ranted a special issue of the journal TopiCS in Cognitive Science
1More ”accessible” being perhaps the more accurate characterization.
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dedicated to visual-spatial representations, with milestone contri-
butions on visual analytics [12], graph comprehension [27], and
diagrams [7], with comprehensive reviews of visual-spatial repre-
sentations as tools for thinking [31] and corresponding implications
for design [14]. It is worth noting that while the articles discussing
visual analytics, diagrams and statistical graphics might have found
a home at a VIS conference (after the 2010 cognitive turn) the latter
review articles would be more out of place, but are indicative of work
that should be at the theoretical core of a Visualization Psychology.
4 A PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL
As psychologists, we are concerned not only with the tools, design,
and efficacy of such representations, but with their mechanics: how
they function (or not). This function is enacted between the arti-
fact(s) and person(s), embodied, and situated in their environments
and complex social structures. What follows is a first proposal
for what minimal conception of external representation might be
taken into the “hard core” of any Lakatosian research programme in
Visualization Psychology.
When we study a visualization, we are studying the func-
tion of an external representation: the construction of
meaning in a distributed cognitive system. The con-
struction of meaning is oft followed by intelligent action
with that meaning, be it by learning, making a decision,
solving a problem, forming a judgement, or any of a
multitude of complex cognitive activities which form the
communicative context of the representation.
Here we admit visualization as a subset of external representation,
an active construction (rather than transmission) of meaning, and
that meaning serves some purpose in the context of interaction with
the representation. What is crucial is that we orient ourselves equally
toward the artifact and the procedure; representation as thing, and
representation as process.
5 A PROBLEM SPACE
We have moved from the study of computer-generated, interactive,
graphics, to any externalization of thought. What we are left with,
it seems, is a Goldilocks problem. The idiomatic conception of
visualization is too narrow, and a faithful conception of external
representation, too broad. Fortunately there are dimensions along
which this metaphorical problem space can be surveyed. We might
think of these dimensions as ranges along which we can tune our
attention, progressively expanding or narrowing our scope of inquiry
depending on the state of theoretical and technological advancement.
5.1 On Sensory Modality: How we represent
External representations can be constructed for any sensory modality,
though by far the most attention has been paid to the visual. De-
servedly so, as visuals are the most pervasive information artifacts,
and the sensory modality about which we have the most understand-
ing. Though we are surely far from exhausting the wellspring of
questions to be asked of visual representations, and contributions
for vision scientists to make, I suggest that we accept within our
scope multi-sensory representations. From a theoretical stance, this
requires broader inclusion of expertise across perceptual psychology,
though the applications are consequential. Accessibility demands
informationally-equivalent representations for those without visual
perception, in an increasingly visualization-driven world.
5.2 On Encoding: How we represent
Though I’ve noted the lack of precision in defining the scope of
visualizations, there has been no lack of effort in cataloging [13] and
taxonomizing them, from general descriptive frameworks [3,9,23,28–
30], to those concerned with specific domains of data [1, 2, 4]. Two
particularly useful (and under-appreciated) are those of Engelhardt
[10] who offers an atomic, generative framework deserving of its
characterization as a language of graphics, and Massironi [18] who
offers both a taxonomy and evolutionary timeline.
While most taxonomies deal with some intersection of graphical
structure and data type (eg. geographic-maps, relational-networks),
the more common distinction in the cognitive and learning science
literature is the continuum from descriptive to depictive, roughly
analogous with symbolic to analog, or propositional to graphic.
These terms refer to a semiotic modality (also: medium), which indi-
cates the degree of convention (how arbitrary) the relation between
a representation and thing to which it refers. While the poles of a
depictive–descriptive continuum can be easily identified, there lays
betwixt a murky medium. At what point of abstraction does an icon
become a symbol? When it is no longer identifiable as its referent
without convention? In whose judgment? We are more accurate
in describing our scope of inquiry as multimedia, than ‘primarily
graphic’. I propose that while origins of visualization as a field lie in
the distinction of graphics from text, fundamental questions about
framing, persuasion, and even comprehension rely on understanding
the function of text alongside graphics. It is rarely the case that
external representations of the visual graphic variety are not accom-
panied by some form of linguistic propositions or notation. Indeed,
a visualization without a title and labels may be worth no words at
all.
5.3 On Purpose: Why we represent
Visualization texts describe the purpose of visualization as being to
‘amplify’ cognition [6,11,32], though as psychologists we appreciate
the story is more nuanced [15]. What kind of cognition, to what end?
The most generic case is that of communicating to simply inform:
the boxplot in my manuscript or barchart in newspaper, where I aim
to inform the reader of some aspects of the underlying information,
in as clear a manner as possible. But I might design that artifact
differently if I want you to explore the data, to undertake an analysis,
make a decision, a plan, or a forecast. I’ll certainly change my
strategy if I want to strongly persuade you, or alternatively, want
you to use the representation to learn. There are entire systems of
diagrams designed for solving particular kinds of problems, and the
design of representations to support conceptual change is the focus
of entire subdiscplines in STEM education. I use the term commu-
nicative context, to refer to the “cognitive activity” the designer of
a representation intends the user to perform. The structure of these
activities has not been taxonomized, though a compelling framework
for the hierarchical, emergent structure of such activities is detailed
by Sedig & Parsons [25, 26]. The relevant insight is that certain
parameters of a representation, such as the computational efficiency,
or relative explicitness of certain aspects of the data, will be tuned
in accordance with the task the reader is expected to perform.
6 CONCLUSION
We began with the question, ‘What is a visualization?’ and end with
the contention it is a class too narrow to characterize the scope of
our endeavor. When we study visualizations in real-world activity,
we are actually studying multimedia representations. Similarly, we
must work at the development and understanding of multimodal
multimedia representations in order to realize a world where access
to information is not the exclusive privilege of those with visual
perception. While we might focus primarily on graphic visuals to
the extent that they are the most common tools for representing in-
formation, these porous boundaries are both pragmatic and realistic.
By adopting a broader scope, our nascent programme positions itself
at the boundaries of established visualization scholarship, alongside
researchers exploring data visceralization, accessibility and multi-
modal communication, multimedia learning and a wider community
of scholars who share interest in diverse communicative artifacts.
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